A focus on jobs

A colleague stepped into my office yesterday and asked me if I was excited about “one of my kind” being named to head the Council of Economic Advisers. My quizzical look was met with an exasperated response, “he’s a labor economist. Isn’t that what you call yourself?”

In my first day of class yesterday, I explained to my students (in 3 classes they number fewer than 50 in total–fewer than I’ve ever taught in a single class), that I am a labor economist, but that basically means I can do anything I want. It garnered a few laughs, which is nice, but I really meant it. Really, I can do whatever I want.

Alan Krueger, however, cannot do whatever he wants anymore. Though he might have before, now, he has to figure out how to create jobs for the American economy (assuming his nomination gets through Congress). I’ve read a handful of analyses about the Krueger appointment. Approval from the center, criticism from the left, nods of approval from the right, crazy talk from the far right. I thought Matt Yglesias’ commentary was rather salient. He suggested that instead of an economist who concentrates on small problems, we need a macro person, someone to look at the big picture and provide a large-scale solution.

Among labor economists, Krueger is best known for things like his paper with Card on fast-food workers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey (conclusion: raise the minimum wage; it won’t hurt employment like you think). During his limited tenure in government, he’s become known for things like the Cash for Clunkers program. The programs he designed and/or analyzed all have the feature that they’re small. And well, like me, he’s a microeconomist. Cash for Clunkers ran out of money quickly, and its effect was widely believed to have distorted new car sales in time, but not necessarily boosted new car sales. That is to say that people who were going to buy new cars anyway just bought them earlier because of the program. It didn’t actually incentivize that many people to buy cars who weren’t going to anyway. If those earlier sales had saved a car company or two from oblivion, or if the timing of that cash infusion had been instrumental in creating a lot of jobs, we would have cheered it more heartily, but the fact is that it probably did neither of those things. And so while car sales increased during the program, they didn’t manage to save Chrysler.

The big criticism of Krueger (and others who do similar work) is that we can measure these tiny effects in time, but we’re not able to measure the general effects in the economy. The minimum wage paper, in my opinion, is a pretty good paper. You can quibble with the choice of counterfactual and claim there are cultural differences in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, but no counterfactual is perfect. While that paper may do a good job of explaining what happens if we raise the minimum wage in New Jersey, it doesn’t tell us what will happen if we raise the minimum wage in the whole country. Will companies be able to pass on the costs in every state? Are there enough people whose reservation wage lies between the current minimum wage and some theoretical increased wage that we would get more productive or better workers? There remain many questions.

On the plus side, I have to imagine that Alan Krueger knows these things. I, a lowly, recently defended PhD, liberal arts college teacher probably doesn’t have to tell a tenured Princeton professor to think about general equilibrium effects. And while we might need something large scale to reset the economy and get things going, I’ve often though that the CEA could use an infusion of clever and creative labor economics ala Krueger or Angrist.

And at least he hasn’t gone off and told the world that women are bad at math and science.

More of them or more willing to say it?

Today’s NYT had an article on the cities with the highest proportion of gay couples. Interestingly, the list doesn’t include many high-density cities or the well-known gay neighborhoods. The lack of historical data and rapidly changing social norms make it difficult to differentiate between whether there are simply more gay couples living in places like Rehoboth Beach, DE, or whether they’re simply more visible and more willing to disclose their orientation.

While this limitation means we cannot make  statements about the changing demographics in these cities, I think it does say something pretty profound about standards of acceptable social behavior in small towns and, to some extent, all over the country.

How we measure violence

I’ve noticed lately that the way we talk about prevalence of gender-based violence has changed lately. While we used to talk mostly about incidence of violence, a measure riddled with problems of underreporting and non-response, more scholars, NGOs and thus media outlets are concentrating more on measures of acceptability of violence. The questions “is wife-beating ever justified?” and “when is wife-beating justified” are garnering more attention than ones that seek to pin down the number of times a wife was actually beaten. The extremely high affirmative response rate to these questions (a recent TrustLaw post cites a UN study claiming at least 25% of people think it’s justifiable for a man to beat his wife in 17 of 41 countries surveyed) reinforces the notion that we might be missing a lot with surveys that get at instance.
it of course, does nothing to mitigate problems of reporting in places where the practice is outwardly condemned. In the US, I’d imagine, the statistic isn’t very useful as you’re unlikely to find many people who would assert that domestic violence is justifiable.
Additionally, it seems that, just like with incidence reports, the answers are subject to social norms and prevailing custom. In that sense, though, the question about justifiability may more closely measure the social norms themselves than questions about incidence.

To market, to market

I often have to convince people that I what I do is actually economics. While most economists take it at face value, I find that many non-economists, i.e. most people in the world, find it odd that I would consider my process of analyzing investments in children and marriage markets and relationship quality economics. The reason, though not always expressly put, is that most people think economics is about money. An economist, they think, should talk about GDP or the stock market or inflation or the debt crisis.

Lots of economists do, and I do, too. Despite being a microeconomist, I have enough knowledge and background and read the news enough to talk at least somewhat intelligently about macroeconomic issues. Although, once a student asked me in an intermediate macro class to explain credit default swaps. I declined to answer due to time constraints, but really, there are better people who can answer that question than me. Just like there are better people than me to answer questions about why the stock market tanked again today.

But I’m getting off topic. I started reading the NYT this morning after a weekend in the mountains and stumbled upon the Magazine’s Modern Love column, about blogging exes, and another that seemed to call out for my own blog post, before I had even read it. I hadn’t gotten two paragraphs through it before this line appeared: “In short, there really is a marriage market in countries around the world, and economic principles apply to it.” The author, Robert H Frank, had spent the preceding paragraphs discussing dowries, implying that you actually need money to have a market.

Though Frank goes on to discuss how principles of supply and demand have shifted cultural expectations and allows for the existence of a market where money doesn’t change hands, the initial statement does something of a disservice to the field. Markets exist without money. Marriage markets certainly exist, both with and without money. His sentence could have been easily modified to say something about markets how they are popularly understood, or something. It’s semantics, I know, but semantics are important when you’re faced with reinforcing stereotypes. And for the people who don’t make it past that third graf, they perhaps stay with that idea that markets need money to function.

Regardless of the initial misstep, the rest of the piece suggests something rather extraordinary, but also astoundingly simple. While much of the cultural phenomena of later marriage, sex outside of marriage, women going back to work and getting more schooling have, at least in economics papers, been attributed to the introduction of reliable birth control and time-saving devices like the in-home washing machine, Frank suggests that, at least in the US, an oversupply of women in the baby boom generation “bent cultural norm towards men’s preferences.” That is to say that as men were scarce, society played to their more open sexual attitudes, leading to, in particular, more sex outside of marriage and perhaps the decline of marriage as an institution. It’s the war’s fault, essentially, that we’re promiscuous and we cheat and we divorce our spouses at a high rate.

He goes on to use the US, post-war example as a parallel to the much-hyped sex ratio imbalance in China right now. He cites a paper where the authors show that families with sons are spending more on conspicuous consumption goods, particularly housing, in order to display their wealth and better attract a wife for their son. The sudden oversupply of men in China (and other countries in Asia) means that men are changing their spending habits to appear more stable, more able to provide for a wife and children long-term.

The comparison doesn’t seem quite right to me, though. In particular, there is a tremendous waste of resources associated with building bigger homes (or homes that just look like they’re bigger) for the purpose of attracting a mate. For families who are building with money that is marginal, that might otherwise be saved for retirement, or a child’s education (the son they’re trying to marry off or a future generation), spending on house improvements, though necessary according to the authors, is not necessarily the best use of money, nor is it sufficient to find a wife. One could argue that delaying marriage is a waste of resources in terms of producing quantity of children as women spend their most fruitful childbearing years on other things, but I think we can agree that more education for women is not necessarily a bad thing. Even if you want to go that route and get into money spent on IVF for older women, etc, it’s not as overtly wasteful as building sham third stories.

But more importantly, in societies where decisions about marriage are often still made by a family elder (a patriarch?), the shift might not really be towards women’s preferences–the preferences of the scarce resource, as it may be–but preferences of women’s fathers, or both parents. In fact, it’s pretty thinly justified by evolutionary biology and even downright sexist to suggest that women are just in it for bigger houses. Then the comparison breaks down entirely. Supply and demand may be giving more influence to one group, but it’s not the underrepresented group, it’s the group that controls the scarce resource.

The idea that an oversupply of men would shift a world to be more accepting and respectful of women and girls and their wishes and desires is wonderful. The pull of a simple economic explanation (particularly one that is backed by another science, biology in this case) is strong, but likely missing much of the story. Evolutionary biology likely does play a role in cultural norms, but the preponderance of gender-based violence, bride-buying, trafficking of women, son preference, bride burning, etc should make us wary of explanations that rely on assumptions that women are suddenly powerful and influential due to being scarce without exploring their cultural roles in shaping their own lives.

Not back to normal, yet

My plan was to post here twice a week and to be back in the swing of things by August. I started off well, but well, August is a slow news month and also a slow new working papers month and a busy, let’s move to Pennsylvania month. At least for me.

So, I defended my dissertation on Monday and though I have a few revisions, I’m, well, kind of done! It’s exciting. But I’m still not really up to blogging regularly, at least for now. Once I finish this paper, I think we’ll be good.

A slipperly slope argument for more taxes

I have to admit that this whole debt ceiling debate makes me want to tear my hair out. If I had my druthers, I’d sit down every member of Congress. pry their eyelids open and make them read a few economic history books. Because, you know, cutting spending in a deep recession worked so well the last time, *cough* *cough* (Great Depression!) *cough*. But the politics of it all, it’s just maddening is what it is. A bunch of idiots who don’t even know what their constituents want holding this country’s–and possibly the world’s–economy hostage. I honestly (and naively) expected to come back from my Green River rafting trip and the thing would be solved, over, done with. But no, it’s like no time passed at all.

Twitter brought me two great pieces over the last few days that sent my writing juices flowing again after a few days off. The first, which I believe came from @ezraklein (correct me if I’m wrong), said something to the effect of “The US is the only country in the world with the luxury to create an economic crisis where there is none.”

Just dwell on that one for a minute.

The second was a question retweeted by the official White House twitter account (@whitehouse for the #WHChat) asking why those who are already paying the most taxes should be asked to pay more, invoking the  “it’s not fair” argument. The question of who pays more and how much is a sticky one, one that made heavy press a few months (weeks? I don’t know what’s happening to time right now) when it was announced that only 50% of Americans paid any taxes (really, federal income tax in one year with record-high unemployment; you’d be hard pressed to find someone who actually pays zero taxes). I don’t know what segment of the population the question-asker was referring to, but it got me thinking about who pays taxes and why.

From an practical standpoint, we have many different types of taxes; income taxes, use taxes, sales taxes, estate taxes, property taxes, etc. From an economic standpoint, we split taxes into bigger groups. One of those distinguishing factors of how we group comes down to who pays. From the simplest, principles of economics perspective, we have taxes that are based on use and those based on ability to pay. Use taxes are designed with the idea that the people using the service should be the ones taxed. Use taxes are often sales taxes, they’re associated with things that we use. Take a simplistic example like gasoline, which we tax, and much of the taxes go to repaving roads. If you buy gasoline, you pay tax on it based on how much you buy. If you don’t buy gasoline, you don’t pay tax on it, simple enough. Consequently, you also don’t contribute much to upkeep of roads. If you’re not buying gasoline, you’re probably not using the roads much (or your form of using them is much less destructive or limited than if you went by car), so, you don’t pay for roads.

The ability to pay principle says that those with the greatest ability to pay should pay more taxes. By this logic, a person who makes $200,000/year should pay more in gasoline taxes than a person who makes $20,000/year. Of course, creating a taxation system like that creates all sorts of incentives to lie and cheat and would be incredibly difficult to manage, but it is interesting to think about how use and ability to pay are actually interconnected, particularly at a federal level. Without any numbers to back me up, I’m certain that those with more money not only have a greater ability to pay, but also use more services. I’m going to distinguish here between services and transfers. There’s no doubt that people who make no money receive more transfers–e.g. food stamps, welfare payments, unemployment assistance–than wealthy people. But even though wealthy people may not be applying for food stamps or welfare, their money is being protected by banking laws, their consumer interests are greater because they buy more, they use the courts more for lawsuits (if not perhaps criminal defense), they’re greater users of health care (even more so if they have insurance). I of course have nothing to back this up, and realize fully that the argument could be made in precisely the opposite direction for public assistance. But then, the ability to pay part kicks in; if you’re requesting TANF funds, you have very low ability to pay.

The other reason I don’t like this argument, of course, is that it creates a slippery slope in terms of demanding to pay taxes only on the things we use. If a poor person keeps all their money stuffed in their mattress, they’re not ‘using’ the SEC or the FDIC or other federal banking institutions, and we might find dissenters trying to discount such expenditures from their taxes ala Maggie Gyllenhaal in Stranger Than Fiction. Talk about a nightmare. I think our tax code is complicated enough as it is.

With that rant being done, and regardless of whether paying taxes is fair or not, I’ll share another gem adapted from twitter. Just because you want to order a hamburger next time doesn’t mean you don’t have to pay for the filet mignon you already ate. It does appear that something is going to happen tonight, though, so we’ll see.

Where I’ve been

The past few weeks have been spent in approximately two places. The first was in front of my computer, at my desk.

The second, though, was here, on a boat on the Green River, running through Lodore Canyons and through Echo Park and Split Mountain. It was beautiful. I’ll take the River over my desk any day.

But now, back to Economics. Thesis, defense, pulling my hair out thinking about the debt ceiling negotiations, etc.

Quiet

I’m so excited that this blog is finding a voice and an audience. My apologies to all as I’ve been quiet and will likely continue to be for the next two weeks or so. I am racing to finish my dissertation, then will be on a rafting trip down the beautiful Green River for just under a week. I’m told I’m not allowed to bring work. Though I know it’s a physical impossibility to bring my computer on the river for five days, it will be much more difficult to emotionally distance myself from economics, gender, children, violence, etc, or at least the constant turning of my brain on such things. Back in August, I promise!

I think Greece could do with a little social norms marketing on taxes

Greece has a serious problem with paying its taxes. It’s a self-reinforcing problem because when people see the system as corrupt, they think their money will be wasted and they won’t face consequences, so they cheat more.

I liked this quote from James Surowiecki in the New Yorker:

According to a remarkable presentation that a member of Greece’s central bank gave last fall, the gap between what Greek taxpayers owed last year and what they paid was about a third of total tax revenue, roughly the size of the country’s budget deficit. The “shadow economy”—business that’s legal but off the books—is larger in Greece than in almost any other European country, accounting for an estimated 27.5 per cent of its G.D.P. (In the United States, by contrast, that number is closer to nine per cent.) And the culture of evasion has negative consequences beyond the current crisis.

It seems to me that Greece needs a serious infusion of social norms marketing (among several other things). I can see the billboards now: “People in our community think it’s good to pay your taxes.”

Okay, back to dissertating. So close.

Polygamy and Social Insurance

I’m currently reading Unnatural Selection, by Mara Hvistendahl, while I’m sitting here trying to tie up the loose ends on my thesis. Or at least, they were only loose ends before yesterday evening, when a small coding error (really, Erin, ‘<‘ instead of ‘>’) meant that I had written this great paper about why we don’t see any result when in fact there might be a really important result. Good work. It’s not like I had plans this weekend, anyway.

At any rate, losing myself in my dissertation means thinking a lot about ‘nontraditional’ unions and the evolving concept of the family, and reading Mara’s book means thinking a lot about all of the men that are going to spend their lives as bachelors in Asia. What I haven’t been thinking much about is the other end of the spectrum, polygamous marriages, which suddenly came up today. A good friend and PhD candidate at UCLA is working in Kenya right now as a field researcher and is occasionally sharing her thoughts on development and field work, etc. Having spent some time in that part of the world and always eager to read anything I can get my hands on, I keep close tabs on what she’s doing.

She posted recently about polygamous marriages and made a joke about how one episode of the TV show Big Love was the extent of her knowledge of polygamy in America. With the same-sex marriage becoming more and more part of our understanding of marriage, I’ve heard a few mutterings that polygamous marriage might be the next ban that is tackled. Ignoring for a moment the torrid history of polygamy in America and its association with forced marriage of children, it’s interesting to think about the value that additional help might afford. In a place with high rates of mortality for young men (from HIV, for instance), the ability to raise one’s children alongside another person, even that person is not a romantic partner and even once shared your romantic partner, seems much more palatable than knocking it out alone.

And, just to bring this full circle, Mara’s prologue starts with the story of her own youth, where two newly single women, Mara’s mother and a friend, banded together to raise their children. They weren’t co-wives or sister-wives, but it seemed to be an arrangement that worked. If you were in a polygamous marriage, you don’t even have search costs associated with finding someone to help you.